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It is a fact quickly learned through experience that the extent
of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
vary depending on the rule employed. The least likely to yield a
candid response is the written interrogatory. The response to the
written interrogatory in practice is the guarded voice of counsel
conceding only so much as the literal phrasing of the question
may compel.
Interrogatories in most instances are much less effective than
oral depositions in getting at the truth, not only because the an-
swers are studied, but also because questions put without the
background of information obtained in answer to other questions
cannot hope to match the effectiveness of the free ranging in-
quiry in oral depositions. An unexpected answer obtained during
oral questioning will often suggest other and even more fruitful
questions.
But the oral deposition is not always the most candid or com-
plete expression available on the subject under inquiry. There
may be written statements taken in connection with the occur-
rence in litigation which furnish a wholly unguarded and care-
fully detailed account of the facts sought to be discovered. Typi-
cally, this statement is one taken close to the time of the occur-
rence. Such "on the spot" statements have been described as "a
catalyst of unique value in the development of the truth through
the judicial process." 1 This study is intended to be a practical
consideration of the status of discovery relative to such state-
ments. Primary attention will be given to the law in the Fourth
Circuit and to two decisions of the court of this circuit dealing
with motions seeking the production of such statements under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The decisions chosen for special attention are Guilford Nat'l
Banko v. Sout hern Ry.,2 and Goosma& v. A. Duie Pyle, Ino.8 This
*Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, Greenville, South Carolina.
1. DeBruce v. Pennsylvania RL., 6 F.R.D. 403, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
2. 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
3. 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
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emphasis is made in the belief that the practicing lawyer for
whom this article is written will want to know the rules govern-
ing in this circuit as a matter of first concern. The discussion
cannot begin, however, without some review of Hickman V.
Taylor.
4
B. Hickman v. Taylor Reviewed
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hickman
v. Taylor remains the dominant pronouncement in the field of
discovery. The question in Hickman arose from an interrogatory
of the plaintiff calling on the defendants, who were tug boat
owners being sued under the Jones Act for the death of a seaman,
to state whether any statements were taken in connection with
the accident causing the tug to sink and resulting in the seaman's
death. The interrogatory also called for the attachment of copies
of all written statements and the exact provisions of any oral
statements. The attorney for the owners of the tug boat had
interviewed survivors of the sinking and had taken their signed
statements. He had also interviewed other persons and made
memoranda of what was told to him.
There was confusion in the lower courts on the rules of proce-
dure properly involved in the case and this was discussed by
the Supreme Court;5 however, the Court was not deterred in
reaching the basic issue: whether the attorney for the defendants
would be obliged to produce the requested statements.
The district court had ordered the tug boat owners and the
attorney to produce all written statements obtained by the at-
torney as counsel and agent for the defendants, and to state in
substance any fact concerning the case learned through oral
statements made by witnesses to the attorney whether or not
included in his private memoranda. 6 The court of appeals of the
Third Circuit reversed, 7 holding that the matters sought were
4. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
5. The procedural problem grew out of the effort to get statements through
requesting that copies be attached to answers to written interrogatories pro-
pounded under FED. R. Civ. P. 33. The district court concluded Rules 33 and
34 were applicable, but the circuit court felt Rule 26 was the applicable rule.
The Supreme Court held that it was clear the plaintiff was proceeding under
Rule 33 relating to interrogatories and not by way of deposition under Rule 26.
The Supreme Court indicated that the proper procedure would have been to
take the attorney's deposition and compel the production involved by a subpoena
duces tecum since production under Rule 34 was limited to parties.
6. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945).
[Vol. 17
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privileged as the "work product of the lawyer."8 The opinion of
the court of appeals was affirmed by the Supreme Court but
on a different ground, and it is the basis of this affirmance that
makes Hickman a name to be reckoned with in the area of dis-
covery herein under consideration.
The Supreme Court held that the statements were not pro-
tected by any privilege.9 They were not made in confidence by
a client to his attorney, and no privilege exists as to information
furnished an attorney by a witness nor as to writings prepared
by counsel for his own use or reflecting his mental impressions.
Nonetheless, the Court declared, before production of documents
from an attorney's files will be ordered, the party seeking dis-
covery must show necessity and justification for such discovery.
This necessity and justification, in the Court's opinion, had not
been shown. In fact, it appeared that the identity of the wit-
nesses in question was known and their testimony was already
on file and open to inspection in a public office. Further, the
Court observed that searching interrogatories had been an-
swered by the defendants. Under these circumstances, the Court
concluded that there was an insufficient showing of necessity
and justification to contend, as the plaintiff's counsel did, that
the information was needed to help prepare for the examination
of witnesses and to insure that nothing was overlooked.
As to the oral statements made to the defendant's lawyer,
another question was presented. Here the Court expressed con-
cern that the standards of the profession would suffer if attor-
neys were forced to disclose what they remember a witness told
them or what they saw fit to write down after talking to a
witness. The Court declared its view that if there should be a
rare situation justifying this sort of production, Hickman was
not such a case. "[W]e do not believe," said the Court, "that any
showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of
this case so as to justify production." 10 Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, Hickman seems to preclude the discovery of oral statements
made to a lawyer.1
8. Id. at 223.
9. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947).
10. Id. at 512.
11. In the adaptation of the federal rules proposed several times for adoption
by the South Carolina General Assembly, the decision of the Court in Hickman
is reflected in modifications of Rules 26 and 34, appearing in the proposals as
Rule 26 (b) and Rule 34 (c). The former provides: "Deponent shall not be
required to produce or relate the contents of any document or writing that
reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions of legal theories;
1965]
3
Freeman: Production of Statements under Discovery Proceedings in Federal C
Published by Scholar Commons, 1964
Soum CAR OLUA LAW REvIEW
0. Effect of Hickman Where Statements Secured by Claims
Investigator
The Court in Hickman12 did not purport to express any rule
pertaining to statements or information obtained by someone
other than the lawyer. This unresolved question has left the law
to be settled on a circuit by circuit basis until the inevitable time
when the matter is finally clarified, either by amendment to the
rules, or a further decision by the Supreme Court.
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Hickman did fashion a
new rule by finding that necessity and justification must be
shown for the discovery there sought. The Court was not con-
cerned with Rule 34 and its requirement that good cause must be
shown for production from the adversary. Yet the temptation
to construe these two notions as one, and thus expand the appli-
cation of Hickman, has been irresistible for some courts. The
most important of such decisions is Alitmont v. United States,
a 1949 opinion of the court of appeals for the Third Circuit.'3
In Alltmont, the statements involved were taken by Federal
Bureau of Investigation personnel who were also lawyers. The
reasoning of the court, however, did not depend upon their being
lawyers. In the court's view it was immaterial that in one case
the lawyer does the investigation himself and in another case
does it through persons employed by him or his client. The court
said:
In either situation, the rationale of the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the Hickman case requires that the same
showing of good cause for the production of such statements
of witnesses should be made by the adverse party seeking
copies of them.14
Thus, under the theory of the court in Alltmont, necessity and
justification must be shown to secure statements taken not only
by the lawyer but by the claims investigator as well. In short,
the investigator's work product would be entitled to the same
protection as the lawyer's work product.
and except as provided in Rule 34 (c), any statements made by a witness to
an attorney." Rule 34 (c) makes such statements unavailable without ". . . a
showing that a denial thereof will lead to actual hardship or injustice." See
draft most recently introduced as S. C. House Bill 1283 (1963).
12. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
13. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
14. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 17
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District courts have split on this question.15 In the Fourth
Circuit, the question was raised in Guilford Nat'l Bank v. South-
emn Ry.'1 but was not decided inasmuch as the court had con-
cluded there was not a sufficient showing of good cause. It was
not until the decision in Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, InG.'
7 that the
court passed on a contention that a statement not taken by the
lawyer was entitled nonetheless to the lawyer's work product
imnunity. In Goosman, the statements involved were written
reports of the operator of a tractor-trailer. These statements
were given to the owners of the tractor-trailer and one Mr. Pyle,
the lessee of the vehicle shortly after the accident which resulted
in the litigation. The statements were made in compliance with
certain rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In an
opinion by Judge Boreman, the court held that the reports did
not represent the lawyer's work product. The holding is not am-
plified by reasoning on the part of the court. From the discussion
and rationale of the supporting citations, however, the court's
holding should be the same if the statements involved were taken
by a claims investigator.18
It is submitted that Hickman ,v. Taylor 9 is properly confined
to its facts. The public policy involved dealt only with the need
to protect the attorney's part in the judicial process from in-
vasion except in the exceptional case, such as where the witness
making a statement is no longer available. The policy reasons
for protecting the lawyer's work product simply do not exist in
the case of the adjuster's work product.
15. For holdings that work product immunity does not apply to statements
taken by claims investigators see California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261
(N.D. Cal. 1961); Dorn v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 155 F. Supp. 203 (N.D.
Cal. 1957); Brown v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ; Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953) ; Royal Exch.
Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Szymanski v. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Herbst v. Chicago, R.I. &
P. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 14 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Virginia Metal Prods. Corp. v. Hart-
ford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Therrien v. Public
Serv. Co., 99 N.H. 197, 108 A.2d 48 (1954). Contra, Snyder v. United States,
20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Floe v. Plowden, 10 F.R.D. 514 (E.D.
S.C. 1950) ; Raudenbush v. Reading Co., 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; Hanke
v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947); cf.
Adams v. United States, 260 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. deltied, 359 U.S.
934 (1959).
16. 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
17. 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
18. In support of its holding on the point, the court cites United States v.
Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 282 (N.D. Ill. 1959), affd, 367 U.S. 909 (1961) ;
Morrone v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1947); 4 MooPn, FEu-
ERAL PRACTICE 26.23, at 1387 (2d ed. 1962).
19. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
1965]
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D. The Question of Good Cause Under Federal Rule 34
The extreme showing of necessity and justification required by
Hickman 2 will probably not be required by the district courts
of the Fourth Circuit, particularly in view of Goosman, except
where the statement or report involved is actually the handiwork
of the attorney. While this clarifies the applicable rule, it by
no means furnishes an automatic answer to the question of
whether or not production will be required in any given case.
The battleground simply shifts to the issue of good cause under
Rule 34. Here it is undoubtedly the fact that a lesser showing
is required in order to prevail. Precisely what is required for a
showing of good cause under Rule 34 is the subject of the two
recent decisions of the Fourth Circuit, Guilford Nat'l Bank v.
Southern Ry.21 and Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, In.,21  both men-
tioned earlier.
Rule 34 is a comprehensive provision which, among other
things, empowers the court on a motion showing good cause
to order any party to produce documents and things, not privi-
leged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b). This rule deals
with depositions and provides that examination may be had
regarding any matter, not privileged, relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending litigation. It is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if
it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.
In Guilford, the court of appeals, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Sobeloff, reversed the judgment of the district court
which had held the defendant in contempt for refusing to obey
an order requiring production, under Rule 34, of statements of
witnesses taken by the defendant's claim agent. The action was
instituted by an administrator suing for the death of the dece-
dent killed in an automobile-train collision. On the day following
the collision, the defendant railway's claim agent secured written
statements from six witnesses and, within a week of the accident,
from four other witnesses. Additional statements were gathered
by the claim agent on two later dates. The plaintiff's attorney
was notified of the accident three days after it occurred and
began his investigation late on the fifth day following the acci-
20. Ibid.
21. 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962).
22. 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
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dent. On the sixth, seventh and eighth days, he interviewed wit-
nesses but took no statements. After the institution of suit, the
defendant informally disclosed the names and addresses of the
train crew and, in answer to interrogatories, furnished the names
and addresses of all persons interviewed by it. The plaintiff's
motion seeking production of documents, including the written
statements, followed.
The court conceding that the statements were in the defend-
ant's sole possession and were relevant to the controversy, holds
that this much alone does not constitute good cause under Rule
34. Relevancy, the opinion states, is a requirement of all dis-
covery, including depositions given orally or on written inter-
rogatories. Hence, the additional requirement under Rule 34 and
Rule 35 (Rule 35 provides for physical and mental examinations
of a party) that good cause be shown indicates the necessity
of a greater showing of need.
Having concluded that relevancy was not the equivalent of
good cause, Chief Judge Sobeloff then considered whether the
plaintiff had presented other circumstances sufficient to justify
the order for production. The argument was made that some of
the statements sought were taken a day after the accident and
that the witnesses questioned at a later date would not be able
to recapture their immediate preceptions of, and reactions to,
the accident. The opinion acknowledged "that the courts are
unanimous in holding that a showing that the statements were
made at the time of the accident satisfies the good cause require-
ment of Rule 34 .123 But in such cases, the opinion notes "oppos-
ing counsel had no opportunity to question the witnesses until
weeks or months later."24 After observing that the plaintiff
began interviewing witnesses six days after the accident and
concluded three days later, the court said:
Absent circumstances to the contrary, there is no reason
to suppose that an interview of a witness six days, or even
nine days, after the accident is any less reliable than a state-
ment taken on the day following the accident. If there were
23. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 1962).
In support of this point the court cited Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d
987, 991-92 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 1 (1953) ; Cali-
fornia v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ; Brown v. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 4 MooRE, FFDERAL PRAC-
TIcE 34.08, at 2452 (2d ed. 1950); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 12, 70-73 (1960); cf.
New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1957).
24. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 1962).
1965]
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circumstances indicating a distinct and irremediable disad-
vantage to a party who is compelled to rely on statements
obtained by him later than those obtained by the other party,
a different case might be presented.
25
In answer to a contention that a special circumstance existed
because some of the witnesses were members of the defendant's
train crew, the court concluded that although the requirement
is more easily satisfied when witnesses are employees, this fact
alone is not a sufficient showing of good cause.
Goosmam was decided by the court in the following year. In
a suit for personal injuries sustained when his automobile col-
lided with a tractor-trailer, the plaintiff was refused production
under Rule 34 of written reports made by the driver of the
tractor-trailer to the owner and lessee within a short time after
the collision. The facts asserted to constitute good cause were
set out in plaintiff's motion.26 It was asserted that the plaintiff
was hospitalized as a result of certain injuries suffered on De-
cember 9, 1959, and thus was prevented from investigating or
engaging counsel to investigate his case for many weeks; that
he was released from the hospital on March 11, 1960, and re-
tained counsel on March 15, 1960; that his counsel contemplated
making the defendant's driver a party and deemed it improper
and unethical to interview him; that when the driver's oral
deposition was taken on January 24, 1962, the driver was ad-
vised by counsel not to answer when asked if there were any
variances or discrepancies between his prior written statements
and his statement on deposition. In the court's decision, Judge
Boreman quoted that portion of the opinion in Guilford that
noted the cases are unanimous in holding that a showing the
statements were made at the time of the accident satisfies the
good cause requirement of Rule 34; the court then compared the
two cases:
25. Ibid.
26. The court considered a contention that an affidavit was required to show
the facts supporting the motion. The court agreed that this is a better practice
but not indispensable. The court noted the cases cited in 4 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE ff 34.07, at 2442-43, n.6 (2d ed. 1950, Supp. 1962) holding that facts
alleged in a motion and not otherwise appearing of record are not required to
be sworn to or contained in an affidavit, and concluded that in any event, the
instant case would not require a ruling that an affidavit was necessary inasmuch
as most of the facts alleged to support good cause were properly before the
court in filed interrogatories, depositions, and stipulations, and that other facts




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1964], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss4/7
PRODUCTION OF STATEMNTS
The Guilford case was distinguished on its facts because
there plaintiff's counsel had interviewed the witnesses be-
tween six and nine days after the accident and, in the ab-
sence of circumstances indicating a distinct and irremediable
disadvantage to the moving party, the information thus ob-
tained was deemed as reliable as that obtained by the de-
fendant on the day following the accident. Goosman's
situation, however, fits the general rule enunciated in the
prior cases rather than the exception illustrated by the facts
in Guilford. Goosman and his attorneys were not only pre-
vented from taking Anderson's statement for at least four
months but, under the facts of this case, Goosman may have
sustained a disadvantage affecting the fundamental issues
of liability.
27
The opinion makes it clear that counsel's notion that he could
not properly contact the driver, since he intended to make him
a party defendant, played no important part in the decision of
the court. It was not, in the court's phrase, "essential to a show-
ing of good cause."
28
The rationale of the decision would appear to be: where one
is prevented from investigating an accident for a substantial
period of time, he may call on his adversary for statements taken
at a time close to the accident. The driver's refusal, on advice
of counsel, to answer the question as to any discrepancy between
his oral deposition and the earlier statement, while considered
as a matter of significance by the court, would not seem to be
an essential requirement to a showing of good cause.
Whether good cause is shown will always depend on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. It will also depend to a degree
on the particular judge, for the matter is one addressed to the
court's discretion. In both Guil ford and Goosman, the district
court transgressed what Chief Judge Sobeloff has called the
"latitude of discretion.129 This transgression provided the occa-
sion for the circuit court to furnish some helpful delineation of
the boundaries of good cause: applicable at least in the Fourth
Circuit.
The opinion in G'uilford is helpful, not only for its holding,
but also for the suggestions that the result might have been dif-
27. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F2d 45, 51 (4th Cir. 1963).
28. Id. at 53.
29. Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1962).
1965]
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ferent under other circumstances, some of which counsel might
have controlled. For example, Chief Judge Sobeloff observes
that the case might have been different if depositions of the
employees had been taken by the plaintiff. Then perhaps, a
showing might have been made that the deponents "were reluc-
tant to speak freely, or were openly hostile or that there was some
reason to believe that their prior written statements were incon-
sistent with what they told him." 30 In Goosman, where a deposi-
tion was taken prior to the motion for production, a reason to
suspect inconsistency was present, although, perhaps not neces-
sarily so. It seems likely that where reason exists to suspect in-
consistency in a witness' story, the court would order production
of a statement by the witness, even though the party seeking
it had taken a statement or deposition of the witness at or near
the same time.
In citing cases upholding a showing of good cause in each
instance, Chief Judge Sobeloff additionally noted that Guilford
was not a case:
1. Where the witness who gave the adversary their written
statements are presently unavailable,31 or
2. Shown to be hostile,3 2 or
3. Where the plaintiff is financially unable to conduct an
independent investigation.33
The enumerated instances suggest avenues to a showing of
good cause which may be present in a given case and which one
might fairly expect the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit to uphold.
E. Conclusions As To Desirable Application Of Rule 34
The requirement of a court order on a showing of good cause
under Rule 34 does not appear in any other discovery rule ex-
cept Rule 35 providing for physical and mental examinations.
Obvious reasons exist for the requirement of the showing under
Rule 35. The reasons are not equally clear in every case under
Rule 34. There is no great physical burden in being compelled
to furnish a copy of statements taken in connection with an
30. Id. at 926.
31. See Hilton v. Contiship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
32. See Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).
33. See Naylor v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 10 F.R.D. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
[Vol. 17
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occurrence in litigation. It may be embarrassing, but it cannot
correctly be called harassing or burdensome.
A person hearing a statement not reduced to writing may be
required to repeat what was said in the course of an oral depo-
sition or in answer to interrogatories. There is no logical reason
for making the contents of a written statement less available.
It is still the law, however, that under Rule 34 such state-
ments can only be obtained on a showing of good cause.84 As
the concept of good cause takes on full shape in this area of
discovery, it is hoped that the courts will not set unreasonable
obstacles in the way of production. It is submitted that such
obstacles are not required or desirable either in logic or by any
public policy.
34. An amendment to Rule 34, proposed in 1955 but not acted upon, sought
to authorize submission of interrogatories asking that copies of described classes
of documents be attached to answers. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 1 26.23,
at 1461-64 (2d ed. 1962) for a discussion of the advisory committee's proposals.
The rules proposed for adoption in South Carolina also provide for obtaining
copies of designated documents and things without a court order by requesting
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